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A B S T R A C T
It is increasingly argued that preferences and values for complex goods such as ecosystem services are not pre-
formed but need to be generated through a process of deliberation and learning. While the number of studies
incorporating deliberation in monetary and non-monetary valuation of ecosystem services is increasing, there is
a limited theoretical basis to how values are inﬂuenced and shaped in social valuation processes. In this paper
we present the Deliberative Value Formation (DVF) model, a new theoretical model for deliberative valuation
informed by social-psychological theory. Anchored within a broader theoretical framework around shared and
plural values, the DVF model identiﬁes a range of potential positive (e.g. learning) and negative (e.g. social
desirability bias) outcomes of deliberation and key factors that inﬂuence outcomes (e.g. ability to deliberate,
institutional factors, power dynamics). It also conceptualises how values may be formed by ‘translating’
transcendental values, our principles and life goals, into more speciﬁc contextual values. Underpinned by this
theoretical model, we present a six-step template for designing deliberative valuation processes. The DVF
provides a theoretical and methodological framework for more rigorous monetary and non-monetary
deliberative valuation, and enables more eﬀective integration of social learning and plural knowledges and
values in valuation and decision-making.
1. Introduction
There is broad recognition that ecosystem services have been
undervalued in decision-making. Over recent decades this has led to
wide-ranging attempts to consider how ecosystems provide beneﬁts to
human well-being and what the value of these beneﬁts may be. In
economics, values are generally assessed in monetary terms.
Neoclassical economics assumes monetary values to reﬂect fully
informed, individual preferences for one alternative over another,
revealed in behaviour or stated in willingness to pay surveys (Urama
and Hodge, 2006; Lawson 2013). Many non-monetary approaches to
ES valuation such as public participation GIS are based on a similar
instrumental paradigm (Raymond et al., 2014). However, it is increas-
ingly argued that, when considering complex and often unfamiliar
goods such as ecosystem services, preferences and values can be
incomplete and need to be formed through some sort of deliberation
and learning process (e.g. Macmillan et al., 2002; Urama and Hodge,
2006; Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Völker and Lienhoop, 2016; Kenter,
2016a, 2016c; Kenter et al., 2011, 2016a). While the number of studies
using such approaches for eliciting values is rapidly increasing, and
there has been signiﬁcant investigation of broader ethical and political
theory that could underpin deliberative valuation (e.g. Wilson and
Howarth, 2002; Niemeyer, 2004; O’Neill, 2007; O’Neill, Holland and
Light, 2008; Spash, 2007; 2008; Lo and Spash, 2012; Lo, 2013; Kenter
et al., 2015; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), there is only limited
conceptual work on how value formation and elicitation is shaped
through such processes. In particular, greater clarity is needed about
how deliberative processes shape value formation, to both improve the
design of valuation methods and to target research activities towards
improving general understanding of how values are formed and
enacted.
For the purposes of this paper, we take ‘deliberation’ to be a group-
based process of participation, social exchange, reﬂection, learning and
meaningful debate (see Section 2). In such group-based processes,
participants have the opportunity to reﬂect upon, form, express and
debate their knowledge, perspectives, values and beliefs (Spash, 2007;
McCrum et al., 2009; Lo, 2011; Kenter, 2016c; Orchard-Webb et al.,
2016). By integrating deliberation within a structured valuation
process such as deliberative monetary valuation or participatory
multicriteria analysis to inform and appraise decisions, deliberation
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can inform individual values but also lead to group-based values,
which, it is argued, can transcend individual concerns and better
incorporate broader shared and social values (Howarth and Anderson,
2007; O’Neill et al., 2008; Christie et al., 2012; Kallis et al., 2013;
Kenter et al. 2011, 2014a, 2014b, 2015, 2016a, 2016b; Orchard-Webb
et al., 2016; Irvine et al., 2016; Ranger et al., 2016). Consequently,
integrating deliberation into valuation can help participants better
address rights, responsibilities, equity, fairness and other moral and
political considerations as part of the value formation process
(Niemeyer and Spash, 2001; O’Neill 2007; Orchard-Webb et al.,
2016). Deliberative valuation processes are also appealing in that they
provide an opportunity to better consider uncertainties and risks
(Zografos and Howarth, 2010) and to bring out subtle cultural values
(Kenter et al., 2011; Cooper et al., 2016; Edwards et al., 2016; Fish
et al., 2016a, 2016b).
These qualities are important because policy-makers and practi-
tioners currently rely on valuation evidence as a proxy for the social
impacts of decisions about the natural environment, without necessa-
rily considering the broader ethical and cultural dimensions of the
values that may be enhanced or compromised by the decision. This can
lead to decisions being made that appear to be environmentally and
economically beneﬁcial, but that do not resonate with, or end up being
actively opposed by certain social groups or substantial sections of the
population (an illustrative examples of this is provided by Irvine et al.,
2016).
Deliberation forms values through processes that may either or
both inform and enable reﬂection with reference to ethics and
democratic principles (Lo and Spash, 2012). Nonetheless, to date there
has not been any model that speciﬁcally explains how such a process of
value formation is constituted and how values are inﬂuenced and
shaped in group-based deliberative valuation processes. This is an
important gap in our knowledge, because without understanding how
values are formed and inﬂuenced by deliberation, it is challenging to
explain signiﬁcant diﬀerences that have been found between monetary
and non-monetary values that people express for the natural environ-
ment in deliberated versus non-deliberated and individual versus
group settings (Kenter, 2016b; Kenter et al., 2011, 2014b, 2016a).
While there are clearly challenges associated with deliberative and
participatory methods, such as potential for social desirability biases
and unequal power (e.g. Cooke and Kothari, 2001), which we will
discuss below, empirical work has shown that valuation participants
can feel more conﬁdent about group-deliberated values than about
their individual than about individual, non-deliberated values, and can
prefer the use of deliberative over individual valuations as a basis for
decision-making (Clark et al., 2000; Kenter et al., 2016a).
To aid understanding and design of valuation processes, this paper
presents a new theoretical framework called the Deliberative Value
Formation model (DVF). The DVF was developed as part of a broader
framework around shared, plural and cultural values of the environ-
ment for the UK National Ecosystem Assessment (Kenter et al., 2014b,
2015), which involved the analysis of two large-scale, national and two
local valuation case studies, together including 29 deliberative mone-
tary and non-monetary valuation workshops across the UK. The DVF
integrates what we know about deliberation and values to explain how
values are shaped and formed through deliberative valuation.
Particularly, it conceptualises how contextual values – the relative
importance of particular objects of value (Kenter et al., 2015) –
expressed through value indicators such as willingness to pay, rankings
and ratings, can be shaped by transcendental values – our overarching
principles and life goals that transcend speciﬁc contexts, such as
honesty, enjoyment, social status, peace (Kenter et al., 2015) – in
and through deliberative processes.
The model can assist researchers and practitioners to design more
eﬀective and transparent deliberative approaches to both monetary and
non-monetary valuation and improve how ethical and cultural con-
cerns are incorporated in valuation evidence and decision-making.
While the DVF has been developed in the context of valuing ecosystem
services, the relevance of the model extends into any area where there
is a need to evaluate and deliberate subtle, complex or contested values,
such as in decisions around land use or urban planning, health care, or
social services.
This paper ﬁrst brieﬂy reviews the concept of deliberation, its
objectives in valuation, and its relation to shared values (Section 2). We
then review current knowledge of how deliberation forms or shapes
values and how this inﬂuences the extent to which values become
shared (Section 3). The next section outlines the DVF, and its three
components: 1) the key factors that inﬂuence deliberation; 2) the
potential outcomes of deliberation; and 3) a chain of inﬂuence
informed by social-psychological theory, that models how deliberation
allows transcendental values to be applied to particular contexts and
translated into contextual values and value indicators (Section 4).
Building on the theoretical model, we also present a six-step metho-
dological template for deliberative monetary and non-monetary valua-
tion (Section 5). We then come to a ﬁnal discussion (Section 6) and
conclusions (Section 7) on the implications of the DVF for the under-
standing and design of deliberative valuation.
2. Deliberation, valuation and shared values
Deliberation is essentially a process by which something can be
considered, evaluated or appraised. Deliberation can be considered as
an individual cognitive-reﬂective process (e.g. Betsch, 2011), such as a
person deliberating over some kind of personal decision, or as a
process of social interaction, such as a group of people trying to
establish a common point of view. It can also be a wider process of
decision-making, such as Habermas’ ideal of ‘communicative ration-
ality’ where discussion and making sense of information is considered
to generate new knowledge (McCrum et al., 2009) and enhance
democratic processes (Orchard-Webb et al., 2016). In the ecological
economics literature, deliberation is mostly referred to as some form of
group process that aims to enhance the elicitation of preferences and
values (e.g. Spash, 2007; Zografos and Howarth, 2010; Lo, 2013;
Kenter, 2017). By deﬁnition, the notion of deliberative value formation
recognises that contextual values are, initially, unformed or incomple-
tely formed – if they were perfectly formed there would be no point in
deliberating them (also see Kenter et al., 2016b for a discussion of
unformed vs partially formed values). In other words, contextual values
cannnot be independently observed, and need to be recognised as
endogenous to the valuation process (O’Hara and Stagl, 2002). This is
particularly the case when considering complex and often unfamiliar
goods, such as biodiversity and many ecosystem services, where people
lack information to inform their values, but also where they may not
have fully considered how their transcendental values relate to the
object of value.
Lo and Spash (2012) discriminate three main objectives to delib-
eration: preference ‘economisation’, ‘moralisation’ and ‘democratisa-
tion’, with economisation focusing on informing individual contextual
values, moralisation on bringing out transcendental values to deter-
mine the morally preferred course for society, and democratisation on
providing a platform for communicatively rational debate, emphasising
value plurality (Table 1).
To achieve these diﬀerent objectives, a process of deliberation could
include the following elements (based on Habermas, 1989; Daniels and
Walker, 1996; Bloomﬁeld et al., 1998; Bessette, 2001; Abelson et al.,
2003; Patel et al., 2007; Elwyn, 2010; Mummery and Rodan, 2013;
Halpern and Gibbs, 2012):
1. the search for, acquisition of, and social exchange of information,
gaining knowledge (by learning about the information acquired),
and the expression and exchange of transcendental values and
beliefs, to form reasoned opinions;
2. the expression of reasoned opinions (rather than exerting power or
J.O. Kenter et al. Ecosystem Services 21 (2016) 194–207
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coercion), as part of dialogic and civil engagement between partici-
pants, respecting diﬀerent views held by participants, being able to
openly express disagreement, providing equal opportunity for all
participants to engage in deliberation, and providing opportunities
for participants to evaluate and re-evaluate their positions;
3. identiﬁcation and critical evaluation of options or ‘solutions’ that
might address a problem, reﬂecting on potential consequences and
trade-oﬀs associated with diﬀerent options; and
4. integration of insights from the deliberative process to establish
contextual values around diﬀerent options, and determining a
preferred option, which is well informed and reasoned.
While the above distinctions and other theoretical papers are
important for helping focus the design of deliberative valuation
approaches towards their intended outcomes, they do not describe in
much detail what those designs should include. In terms of empirical
papers (for a recent review see Bunse et al., 2015), the main framework
used by deliberative monetary valuation studies is the ‘Market Stall’
format. Here, by analogy, participants are given the opportunity to
‘browse’ and become familiar with the goods they are asked to value
before stating their willingness to pay (Macmillan et al., 2002). The
format also provides opportunity for individual deliberation in the form
of time to think about preferences. While the Market Stall provides a
useful framework for preference economisation, it does not consider
transcendental values, value plurality, democratisation and broader
process design. As yet, there is little guidance on how to implement a
more comprehensive approach to deliberative valuation.
For non-monetary valuation, there are a number of examples of
multicriteria analysis being embedded in deliberative processes where
the value of diﬀerent options in relation to chosen criteria are discussed
more broadly by participants prior to, or in conjunction with the
analysis being performed (e.g. Proctor and Drechsler, 2003; Shriver
and Randhir, 2006; Karjalainen et al., 2013). There are also examples
of criteria and their weightings being established through deliberation
with participants (e.g. Cook and Proctor, 2007; Liu et al., 2010, 2011;
Kenter et al., 2014b). However, there are few examples where
participants explicitly consider their transcendental values prior to or
as part of the MCA process (Ranger et al., 2016; Orchard-Webb et al.,
2016).
2.1. Dimensions and types of shared values
Diﬀerent conceptions of individual and shared or social values lie at
the heart of understanding the diﬀerences between diﬀerent under-
standings and applications of deliberation, but are often not made
explicit, or where they are, referred to in unclear and ambiguous terms.
However, to understand how diﬀerent types of value play out and
interact in deliberation it is important to clearly identify and label
them. We develop our discussion on deliberative value formation on
the basis of the theoretical framework developed by Kenter et al.
(2015), who discriminate ﬁve dimensions of shared and social values:
(i) the value concept; (ii) the value provider; (iii) the process used to
elicit values; (iv) the scale of value; (v) and its intention (Fig. 1). In
terms of the concept of value, the authors distinguishe between (1)
transcendental values: guiding principles and criteria that transcend
Table 1
Potential objectives of deliberation in valuation (based on Lo and Spash, 2012).
Preference
economisation
Use of deliberation to ease the respondent's cognitive burden
associated with expressing stated preferences. Information
and group discussions are primarily focused to nurture value
formation and elicitation at the individual level.
Preference
moralisation
Use of deliberation to elicit transcendental values and norms
and apply these to the valuation context. Deliberations tend
to be focused on finding agreement on the value to society of
different goods or policy options.
Preference
democratisation
Deliberation to enable deliberative democratic principles of
value plurality and communicative rationality, integrating
deliberation on both information and transcendental values,
without preset terms for value outcomes.
Elicitation process
Deliberated values
Non-deliberated values
Value intention
Other-
regarding
values
Self-regarding
values
Value
dimensions
Value scale
Value to 
society
Value to 
individual
Value concept
Transcendental
values
Contextual
values
Value
Indicators
Value provider
Societal & cultural 
values
Communal 
values
Individual 
values
Group 
values
Fig. 1. Shared and social values framework: the ﬁve dimensions and seven main types of shared and social values (Source: Kenter et al., 2015). Bold titles indicate non-mutually
exclusive dimensions of value. Emerging from the dimensions, we can diﬀerentiate between types of values that might be termed shared, social, or shared social values (italicised) and
other types of values. For example, provider is a dimension that indicates who might provide values in a valuation setting; societies, cultures, communities and ad-hoc groups provide
societal, cultural, communal and group values, which are all types of shared or social values. Individuals also provide values, but these are not termed shared or social, unless they can be
classiﬁed as such on a dimension other than that of value-provider. Arrows within boxes indicate directions of inﬂuence between diﬀerent types of values. Grey arrows signify that the
type of elicitation process and value provider strongly inﬂuence what value types are articulated along the concept, intention and scale dimensions.
J.O. Kenter et al. Ecosystem Services 21 (2016) 194–207
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speciﬁc situations and that are used to justify actions and evaluate
people and events (e.g. health, security, harmony with nature); (2)
contextual values: values in the sense of opinions about worth or
importance (e.g. the importance of clean water); and 3) value
indicators: the worth of something itself, often expressed in monetary
terms (e.g. a willingness to pay of $100 to improve some environmental
attribute by a certain amount). Diﬀerentiation of transcendental and
contextual values bears some resemblance to the division of ‘held’
values (guiding principles held as important) and ‘assigned’ values
(values assigned to people, places or things) by Rokeach (1973) and
further discussed in an ecosystem service context by Ives and Kendal
(2014). However, Kenter et al. (2015) argue that this conceptualisation
is incomplete and ambiguous. While transcendental values are indeed
held, and indicators are assigned, contextual values, as opinions about
the importance of something, could be seen as both held and assigned,
so it is unclear into what category they fall. Raymond and Kenter
(2016) add that speciﬁcation of values as context-speciﬁc or context-
transcendent is also more informative than whether they are held or
assigned.
Transcendental values are seen as more stable and enduring than
contextual values and indicators, and they are often shared between
communities or within society and thus termed as shared or social
values. Schwartz (1992, 1999) developed a set of 56 key transcendental
values that could be measured across a wide range of cultures. These
include both ethical principles such as honesty and things that can be
characterised as desirable end states, such as ‘a varied life’, ‘family
security’, or ‘mature love’. While cultures adhere to these values to
diﬀerent degrees, the set as a whole appears to follow a universal
structure. For example, cultures that have stronger values relating to
tradition also tend to have stronger values around security, and those
who are willing to transcend their own interests for others are also
more likely to have stronger biospheric values. Transcendental values
are often implicit and thus may require explicit prompts and delibera-
tion to bring them out (Sagoﬀ, 1998; Niemeyer 2004; Bardi and
Goodwin, 2011; Kenter et al., 2011). In social psychology, it has been
generally found that their relation with contextual values and beha-
viour is mostly indirect, and mediated by various types of beliefs, and
norms (Dietz et al., 2005; Raymond and Kenter, 2016). We will discuss
this in more detail in Section 4.
The framework distinguishes four providers of value: (1) indivi-
duals, (2) communities, (3) societies and cultures as a whole, and (4)
ad-hoc groups (in a valuation setting), providing individual, communal,
societal and cultural, and group values. Here the authors conceive of
shared values as values that are expressed collectively, regardless of
whether they are held individually or collectively.
The dimension of scale distinguishes the individual scale, and the
‘social’ scale, which has bearing on value to society, or values in
relation to society. An example is that one might highly value
enjoyment and a varied life for oneself (e.g. reﬂected in consumer
behaviour), but in relation to society other values such as fairness or
responsibility might be more important (e.g. reﬂected in voting
behaviour). An example at the level of indicators is that one might be
willing to pay £10 to improve water quality (individual scale), or think
that the local council should invest £1 million in a water treatment
plant (social/societal scale).
The dimension of intention relates to whether values are self-
regarding or other-regarding, altruistic values. Intention diﬀers from
the scale dimension, as values for others are not necessarily values in
relation to society. Finally, the dimension of elicitation process
distinguishes between the kinds of values that have been derived from
non-deliberative or deliberative processes.
Across these dimensions, the authors identify nine non-mutually
exclusive types of shared and social values (Fig. 1; Table 2), and many
of these are engaged with in deliberation. Valuation aims to achieve an
evaluative outcome, and these outcomes are ‘shared’ or ‘social’ in the
sense that they may be expressed by the group of people that is
deliberating as a whole, e.g. when a citizens’ jury votes on one policy
option over another, but the notion could also refer to the use of a
shared/social valuation process, a focus on a social rather than
individual scale or on the transcendental and contextual values that
we share as a society or community. Thus, broadly, the notion of
‘shared or ‘social values’ represents those values that we come to hold
and assign through our interactions with others in one way or another,
informing and shaping a concept of the common good (Kenter et al.,
2015). In the following section, we will consider how deliberation
might impact on these values.
3. How does deliberation form values?
Understandings of deliberation have been widely used to concep-
tualise or facilitate changes in understanding, behaviours, practices,
and decisions. Here we will consider how values are formed and shaped
through deliberation, how this might inﬂuence the extent to which
values become shared, and how deliberation helps people form group
values or work with the diverse values expressed.
An important mechanism through which deliberation can lead to
value formation is social learning (Reed et al., 2010). Compared to
‘deliberation’, there is very little use of the term social learning in the
economic and non-economic valuation literature. However, social
learning may help explain how values are shaped and shared through
deliberative processes. There are many diﬀerent deﬁnitions and ways of
conceptualising social learning (Ison et al., 2013; Reed et al., 2010;
Table 2
Main types of shared and social values with definitions and dimensions along which they
can be discriminated (Source: Kenter et al., 2015).
Type of shared/
social values
Deﬁnition Associated
dimension
Transcendental
values
Conceptions about desirable end states or
behaviours that transcend specific
situations and guide selection or
evaluation of behaviour and events
(Schwartz and Bilsky, 1987).
Concept
Cultural and societal
values
Culturally shared principles and virtues as
well as a shared sense of what is
worthwhile and meaningful. Cultural
values are grounded in the cultural
heritage and practices of a society and
pervasively reside within societal
institutions (Frey, 1994). Societal values
are the cultural values of a society;
societies may be more or less
homogenous, so there may be multiple
sets of cultural values in one society that
overlap to a greater or lesser degree with
each other.
Provider
Communal values Values held in common by members of
community (e.g. geographic, faith/belief-
based, community of practice or interest),
including shared principles and virtues as
well as a shared sense of what is
worthwhile and meaningful.
Provider
Group values
(within
valuation)
Values expressed by a group as a whole (e.
g. through consensus or majority vote, or
more informally), in some kind of
valuation setting.
Provider
Deliberated values Value outcomes of a deliberative process;
typically, but not necessarily, a
deliberative group process that involves
discussion and learning.
Process
Other-regarding
values
As contextual values: the sense of
importance attached to the well-being of
others (human or non-human). As
transcendental values: regard for the
moral standing of others.
Intention
Value to society Benefit, worth or importance to society as
a whole.
Scale
J.O. Kenter et al. Ecosystem Services 21 (2016) 194–207
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Rodela, 2012). In some deﬁnitions the term ‘social’ refers to the
process that results in learning, while in other deﬁnitions it refers to
the number of individuals undergoing the learning. Reed et al. (2010)
deﬁned social learning as occurring when: 1) there is some change in
the relationship between a person and the world (i.e. change in
understanding); 2) that this change in understanding occurs through
social interaction; and 3) that the learning should occur across more
than one person, at the scale of social units or communities of practice.
Social learning can build and strengthen relationships, enhance
participants’ understanding of other perspectives, and trigger systemic
thinking (Fazey et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2012) and can have long
lasting eﬀects beyond an initial participatory approach (Bull et al.,
2008).
Deliberation encourages participants to learn from each other, to
form reasoned opinions, evaluate positions and reach informed deci-
sions, implying that social learning is a central component of group
deliberative processes (McCrum et al., 2009). However, it is also
possible to view deliberation as a process through which social learning
occurs (Cundill and Rodela, 2012). For example, deliberation through
workshops and stakeholder participation is often used to co-produce
new knowledge and insights about the value of the natural environment
(Steyaert et al., 2007). Through exposure to diﬀerent perspectives, and
reﬂecting on them, participants can change their understanding of the
social-ecological system, e.g. on the state of the environment or of
ecological processes, or the impacts of behaviour or choices (Bardi and
Goodwin, 2011). Importantly, deliberation and social learning both
suggest that social interactions have potential for helping elicit values
that may otherwise be diﬃcult to access.
It has been argued that all forms of deliberation and social learning
are implicitly interactions about values (Goldstein, 1981; Gastil et al.,
2008). In processes such as policy formation and planning, these
interactions can be conceived of as process of ‘valorisation’ where
people may come to greater consensus about what they consider to be
important and thus how a decision (e.g. about public expenditure)
should be made (Klamer, 2003). For example, social dilemmas can
drive changes in values, when groups, individuals or actions based on
self-interest come into conﬂict with those based on more altruistic,
community or environmental interests, leading to the adoption of
values based on varying degrees of co-operation (Giﬀord, 2008). These
changes are more likely in medium-term deliberative processes, e.g.
through a process of on-going political negotiation over weeks or
months, where deliberative processes can lead to the formation of
shared values by enabling a person to “be swayed by rational
arguments and to lay aside particular interests and opinions in
deference to overall fairness and the common interests of the
collectivity” (Miller, 2000, p.10).
Although widely used in the literature about deliberation and social
learning, shorter term processes (e.g. facilitated workshops) are less
likely to shift contextual values (McCrum et al., 2009), yet there are
diverse examples of short-term interventions leading to value change
and formation include changes in greater recognition of political views
(Gastil et al., 2008), changes in the number and diversity of arguments
considered (Dietz, Stern and Dan, 2009; Völker and Lienhoop, 2016),
and greater recognition of the interconnectedness between ecosystems,
culture and society, resulting in changes in stated monetary values
(Kenter et al., 2011).
There has been some cross-comparison between studies to consider
how diﬀerent ways of framing and designing deliberation might
inﬂuence the values expressed. For example Clark et al. (2000)
contrasted their own study on monetary values for a nature conserva-
tion scheme with a study by Brouwer et al. (1999) that had a similar
objective and cultural and geographical context, but the former was
designed to include in-depth discussion while the other involved more
superﬁcial deliberation. In the Brouwer et al. study, participants felt
that their willingness to pay reﬂected their ‘true values’, but in the Clark
et al. case, most felt that they were not meaningfully able to identity
their values without carefully considering impacts, ethics and wider
policies and contexts, and deliberating on this with others. Participants
themselves proposed that valuation should be implemented as a
democratic decision-making process, so that a plurality of values and
moral considerations that could not be captured in a single monetary
metric, could be debated. Thus the depth or intensity of deliberation is
likely to inﬂuence the outcomes.
The diversity of participants in a deliberative process is also likely to
inﬂuence the outcomes of deliberation, including the degree to which
learning takes place and what values are expressed. Newig and Fritsch
(2009) found that the composition of groups inﬂuenced which values
were converged towards. Wright and Rowe (2011) and Cuppen (2012)
found that the extent to which participants learned from each other in
deliberative processes was dependent upon the diversity of perspec-
tives held by those who engaged in the process.
How deliberative processes are managed and facilitated can also
substantially inﬂuence outcomes. Deliberative inequalities may arise
from inequalities in power and communication, and mechanisms are
needed to avoid ‘dysfunctional consensus’, biasing outcomes or ex-
acerbating conﬂict (Bohman, 1996; Reed, 2008; Lehoux et al., 2009).
For example, de Vente et al. (2016) found deliberative processes that
led to conﬂict resolution (implying either a change towards sharing of
values or greater acceptance of the values of others) were signiﬁcantly
more likely to be professionally facilitated, include face-to-face sharing
of information between participants, and enable participants to speak
freely and participate in discussion and decision-making. Facilitation
must be impartial and independent, as far as possible, for these
beneﬁts to be seen, otherwise facilitation may exacerbate power
inequalities and bias outcomes.
Thus, the extent to which social learning and deliberative processes
are likely to lead to greater sharing of values depends on the extent to
which power dynamics are eﬀectively managed. One of the most
signiﬁcant ways that power can inﬂuence such processes is the way
that power is used to decide who and what information is included or
excluded from a deliberative process (Fazey et al., 2013). Viewing it in
this way, power can be seen to operate at the level of groups rather than
individuals, as groups create norms that privilege certain types of
knowledge over others (e.g. scientiﬁc over local knowledge) and that
may exclude certain voices or narratives that challenge the group's
norms (Barnes,1988; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016). Foucault and
Gordon (1980) describe this notion of power as the ‘distribution of
knowledge’ to empower or disempower. This then emphasises the need
to include and respect the knowledge claims of all involved in a
deliberative process, explicitly including and empowering marginalized
groups, so that it becomes possible for values to be expressed and
potentially become shared as a result of engaging in deliberation (also
see Ranger et al., 2016).
Another important cause for diﬀerences in power are diﬀerences
between participants in their prior capacity to engage in deliberation,
originating from diﬀerences in education, professional experience etc.
Such experience often also correlates with social status, and this makes
it very challenging for facilitators to perfectly level the playing ﬁeld. For
example, Orchard-Webb et al. (2016) found group dynamics where
participants were inclined to subtly follow those who had a role as
community leaders. Thus, these tended to take the lead in exercises and
set the tone in determining ways to move forward.
A diﬀerent factor of inﬂuence that can enable value change is that
deliberation makes values more explicit and contestable, so that they
can be openly evaluated and discussed (Lehoux et al., 2009). These
deliberations are particularly important for things that do not always
have direct monetary values (e.g. many ecosystem services). Through
deliberative exercises participants can realise things that are of
(potentially profound) importance to them that they had not realised
explicitly previously, or that they had not connected previously. For
example, in a number of studies where participants deliberated links
between rainforest management, subsistence and cash cropping, and
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culture, previously implicit cultural transcendental values came to play
that then impacted on how participants formed their contextual values
(Kenter et al., 2011; Kenter and Fazey 2015a; Raymond and Kenter,
2016). Kenter (2016b) showed that making a broader set of transcen-
dental values explicit in the context of considering social-ecological
system dynamics lead participants to look more broadly at the natural
environment in relation to their other interests and priorities, making
conﬂicts and trade-oﬀs between competing priorities (e.g. investing
time or money in nature versus the health system or their family) more
apparent.
In the short and medium-term processes that we have discussed so
far, it is more likely that contextual values are changed and formed
than transcendental values. Transcendental values are more ingrained
and can be seen as similar to higher order aspects of cognition which
change through double or triple loop type learning mechanisms that
involve fundamental changes to people's underlying assumptions,
metaphors, and mental models (Fazey et al., 2005; Keen and
Mahanty, 2006; Reed et al., 2010). Nonetheless, as Raymond and
Kenter (2016), Kenter (2016b) and Kenter et al. (2016a) demonstrate,
some changes in the relative importance of diﬀerent transcendental
values can be seen following short-term deliberation if they are
explicitly elicited and deliberated upon. Bardi and Goodwin (2011)
emphasise the importance of explicit cognitive reﬂection in generating
such changes, but also highlight that they are only likely to become
ingrained if the social cues that triggered these changes also endure, or
are repeated.
Indeed, both transcendental and contextual values are clearly
shaped by longer-term social learning processes, starting with the
reproduction of cultural values in children through education and
modelling adult behaviour (Bandura, 1969, 1977; Brody, 1978), and
continuing in intergenerational and community-based interactions that
promote particular social norms, values, preferences and behaviours
(Rist et al., 2003). These processes are termed ‘socialisation’ in the
sociological and anthropological literature and can occur at diverse
social scales and formations (e.g. group, racial, gender, professional)
and at diﬀerent ages (Grusec, 2011; Sabari, 1985; Singh-Manoux and
Marmot, 2005). The values that people express for the natural
environment therefore are continuously shaped and moulded by social
processes over time, dependent on the cultures and institutions that
inﬂuence both the values themselves and the ways in which the social
interactions that form them occur (Everard et al., 2016).
4. The Deliberative Value Formation model
Building on the understanding of values and deliberation developed
in the previous sections, we now present the DVF model, consisting of
three components (Fig. 2). These include:
1. An understanding of the key factors that inﬂuence how deliberation
forms values;
2. An understanding of the potential outcomes of deliberation in a
valuation context;
3. A chain of inﬂuence that conceptualises deliberative value formation
as a translation of transcendental values into contextual values and
value indicators, and links the key components that constitute this
process.
4.1. Key factors inﬂuencing deliberative value formation
From the above discussion, we distil nine key factors that inﬂuence
the outcomes of deliberative valuation, described in Table 3. These
include: 1) the degree of social interaction; 2) the ability of participants
to deliberate; 3) the institutional context; 4) group composition; 5) the
extent of explicit consideration of transcendental; 6) the intensity and
length of time of the deliberative process; 7) the extent of exposure to
new information; 8) power dynamics and peer pressure; and 9)
facilitation and process design. The understanding of these factors
forms the ﬁrst component of the DVF model (Fig. 2).
Clearly, these factors do not operate in isolation but interact. For
example, there are many interactions between power dynamics and the
other factors. The ability of participants to deliberate is likely to be
inﬂuenced by the management of power dynamics, or lack of it. This
can have a strong bearing on the extent to which participants shape
each others’ values through argumentation, avoiding processes of peer-
pressure or ‘dysfunctional consensus’ in which participants express
transient shared values that they do not agree with in order to be
socially accepted. Also, the institutional context favours particular
interests, generating power dynamics; group composition inﬂuences
power dynamics through the relative weight of diﬀerent interests (and
vice versa), and power dynamics and peer pressure can inﬂuence what
values and information are deliberated upon.
Factors can also balance each other out. For example, the political
context may favour particular values and interests, but this could be
counterweighed by overrepresenting less powerful voices, and by
explicitly eliciting a broader set of values. Providing more time may
allow more space for participants with less power and/or a lesser prior
ability to gain conﬁdence.
In all this, the role of facilitators and those that design the process
can be considered a ‘meta-factor’ as it is ultimately the process design
and facilitation that will heavily inﬂuence how the other factors come
into play. For example, to what degree do facilitators represent the
institutional context and can vested interests inﬂuence the process
design, and to what degree do facilitators operate independently? How
capable and experienced are facilitators in drawing out those who are
less conﬁdent and in stimulating social interaction and learning? To
what degree is facilitation open and ﬂexible to the needs and wants of
participants, whilst at the same time bringing out implicit transcen-
dental values, and mitigating peer pressure and bullying?
4.2. Potential outcomes of deliberative value formation
In turn, these factors can lead to a range of potential outcomes in
terms of how, ultimately, contextual values are formed and shaped and
translated into value indicators, described in Table 4. These outcomes
include: 1) changes in systemic understanding; 2) changes in capacity
to deliberate; 3) changes in trust; 4) improved understanding of the
values of others; 5) triggering of dormant values; 6) stronger associa-
tion of contextual values with transcendental values; 7) a shift in value
orientation towards the common good; 8) adaptation and social
desirability bias; and 9) entrenchment. These outcomes need to be
distinguished from the output of deliberative valuation, which would
constitute some sort of individual or group deliberated value indicator,
such as individual or social willingness to pay or a ranking of policy
options in terms of social desirability.
While some outcomes may be generally considered desirable (e.g.
improved systemic understanding) or undesirable (e.g. entrenchment),
what outcomes are considered positive or negative and which are
prioritised are ultimately dependent on the objective of deliberation.
For example, closer association of transcendental and contextual values
may be seen as important from a democratic deliberative perspective,
but as less relevant or even undesirable from a neoclassical economic
perspective. A participatory action research project may emphasise
capacity building, while a deliberative policy formation process that
brings together stakeholders that are unfamiliar with each other may
emphasise trust-building.
Particular outcomes can also interact. For example, increased
systemic understanding and better reﬂection of transcendental values
can together lead participants to look at the natural environment in a
broader context, making conﬂicts, trade-oﬀs and synergies across
diﬀerent societal priorities more explicit. This is exempliﬁed by
Orchard-Webb et al. (2016), where participants following a series of
transcendental value- and system-focused deliberative exercises allo-
J.O. Kenter et al. Ecosystem Services 21 (2016) 194–207
199
cated social willingness to pay particularly prioritising synergies
between social, environmental, cultural and economic interests. In
contrast, Kenter (2016b) found that participants’ willingness to pay for
a range of ecosystem services decreased through deliberative clariﬁca-
tion of their relative importance compared to other social priorities.
4.3. Chain of inﬂuence connecting transcendental and contextual
values
The ﬁnal component of the DVF model is a ‘chain of inﬂuence’ that
discusses the interrelations between key ‘ingredients’ of the DVF
process. We build this conceptualisation on the review of deliberation
in Section 3, our own experience of facilitating deliberations (e.g. Fazey
et al. 2005, 2010, 2011; Kenter, 2016b; Kenter et al., 2011, 2014a,
2014b; 2016a; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016; Raymond and Kenter, 2016;
Ranger et al., 2016; Kenter and Fazey, 2015; Reed and Kenter, 2015;
Reed et al. 2013, In press; Scott et al., 2016), and social-psychological
theory, particularly the Value-Belief-Norm (VBN) theory, the Theory of
Planned Behaviour (TPB), and the Value Change Model (VCM).
The VBN theory was devised by Stern and colleagues (Stern, 2000;
Stern et al., 1999). It considers that transcendental values shape one's
environmental worldview, which in turn inﬂuences beliefs around
awareness of the consequences of actions and ascription of responsi-
bility beliefs for self or other. These in turn shape one's personal norms,
which is thought to determine behaviour. Behaviour is seen to include
both personal (e.g. recycling behaviour) and political actions (e.g.
involvement in environmental social movements) (Stern et al., 1999).
Given this broad conception of environmental behaviour, we consider
this also to include evaluative behaviour in both valuation surveys (e.g.
López-Mosquera and Sánchez, 2012), and deliberation (Kenter, 2016b;
Kenter et al., 2016a), and thus assume a correspondence between
behaviour in this sense, and contextual values. An important implica-
tion of the theory is then that transcendental values are not directly
translatable into contextual values, but are mediated by beliefs and
norms. For example, someone with strong biospheric values, who is
asked if they are willing to provide a donation towards conserving a
particular species, may nonetheless not be willing to pay, as they may
not feel a moral impetus if they do not believe the species to be at risk,
or if they believe someone else is responsible.
The TPB was devised by Ajzen (1991; 1985). Behaviour is seen to be
associated with intentions, which are in turn inﬂuenced by attitudes
(positive or negative evaluations of options); perceived behavioural
control in relation to options (the personal diﬃculty or ease to enact
something); and subjective norms (the normative inﬂuence of signiﬁ-
cant others). In relation to the environment, this means that behaving
pro-environmentally depends on having a positive attitude to the
behaviour, feeling moral support from others, and believing that one
can make a diﬀerence. Thus, this theory again highlights a set of beliefs
and norms that are likely to inﬂuence contextual values (Raymond and
Kenter, 2016).
A third, more recent model that we highlight is the VCM, developed
by Bardi and Goodwin (2011). The VCM speciﬁcally focuses on
potential changes in the relative importance of diﬀerent transcendental
values. The VCM highlights that diﬀerent values are primed by
environmental cues, such as changes in social and cultural contexts.
These changes may occur implicitly through unconscious ques in
diﬀerent situations, but can also be enacted by ‘eﬀortful’ deliberation
(Maio and Olson, 1998; Bardi and Goodwin, 2011). The degree of
stability in changes in the relative importance of diﬀerent transcen-
dental values will depend on whether these values are implicitly
triggered, or explicitly in some kind of intervention, and the depth,
intensity and duration of these deliberations, which in turn depend on
Fig. 2. The Deliberative Value Formation (DVF) model, proving a theoretical template of how an individual forms contextual values and indicators through deliberation with others, the
key factors that inﬂuence this process and its potential outcomes. Arrows indicate directions of inﬂuence. Worldviews and transcendental values, while they inﬂuence the deliberative
process, are considered relatively stable and are only likely to change as a result of intensive, repeated, and/or long-term repeated deliberative processes (dashed arrows).
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the design of an intervention; thus highlighting many of the DVF key
factors of inﬂuence discussed above. In the longer term, the degree of
persistence in value change is also dependent on whether transcen-
dental values can be applied and enacted (which reinforces them), the
degree to which values can be maintained within one's cultural context,
and personal factors such as the degree to which value changes can be
integrated in one's identity.
While there are other socialpsychological theories that have rele-
vance to value formation (e.g. Everard et al., 2016 provide an overview
in the context of long term value change and institutional transforma-
tion), we particularly highlight VBN, TPB and VCM, because both from
our personal experience as facilitators and the insights gleaned from
the broader literature on deliberation reviewed in Section 3, it is clear
that deliberation inevitably refers back to some subset of individual and
cultural transcendental values and norms. Thus understanding this
dynamic is essential to understanding contextual value formation. VBN
and TPB are the two most frequently used psychological theories to
investigate interrelations between values, norms and behaviour in
environmental contexts (Raymond and Kenter, 2016). The VBN model
focuses on personal transcendental values and worldviews, while the
TPB focuses more on social (subjective) norms, and together they
identify the key role that particular beliefs (behavioural control,
ascription of responsibility, awareness of consequences) play as
mediators. The VCM brings emphasis on societal and cultural trans-
cendental values, but also highlights that value change is not solely an
intrapersonal but a dynamic and communicative process where in-
dividuals interact with their sociocultural environment.
Informed by these considerations, the DVF chain in Fig. 2 starts
with societal, cultural and communal transcendental values, which
inﬂuence individual transcendental values. As discussed in Section 3,
and also in line with the VCM, many transcendental values are likely to
be dormant, and thus their inﬂuence will depend on whether they
become explicit through environmental cues in the process, either
through explicit exercises or prompts as part of the process design, or
more informally through social interaction. The DVF chain aligns with
VBN theory in conceiving that individuals form contextual values and
indicators through application of their transcendental values and the
worldviews that depend on them to a speciﬁc context, mediated by
beliefs around those contexts. However, these beliefs are seen as
dynamic, and again inﬂuenced by situational cues. Deliberation can
impact on them through the eﬀect of activated transcendental values
(e.g. changes in beliefs about personal responsibility in relation to the
object of valuation or course of action under consideration), through
exchange of information, including expert and lay knowledge, and
through individual and joint analysis. This can lead to changes in
beliefs around the nature of the social-ecological system or how it
Table 3
Key factors of influence on outcomes of deliberative valuation processes.
Factor of inﬂuence Description
Level of social interaction Deliberative valuation can comprise different degrees of individual vs social deliberation, for example in terms of
consideration of information, whether analytical exercises are individual or group-based, and whether values are
established on an individual or group basis.
The ability of participants to deliberate The extent to which people are able to make their values explicit and deliberate around certain tasks. Ex-ante ability is
likely to be influenced by education, social-economic background, prior experience and social status. The degree to which
participants are ultimately able to deliberate depends on the degree to which ex-ante ability is taken into account and the
process design and facilitation actively supports and enables participants in an inclusive way, e.g. by signalling to less
confident participants that their perspectives are equally valid and important and by including confidence-building and
learning exercises.
The institutional context As a ‘value articulating institution’ (Vatn, 2009), outcomes of valuation are inﬂuenced by the way issues, questions, values
and options are framed: what issues and policy options are in and out of scope of the deliberation and decision-making
context, what level of participation is sought, what information and knowledge is presented (e.g. scientiﬁc vs local
knowledge), whether this can be contested, how values are framed (e.g. as ethically and ontologically plural or not), and by
whom (experts/researchers or participants), and how values will be aggregated (analytical techniques such as econometric
models and aggregation functions, or negotiation, voting etc.).
Group composition Who is included in the deliberation influences the degree to which the group of deliberants is heterogeneous in terms of
social backgrounds, interests and knowledge, whether there are interests that dominate, and whether there are un- or
under-represented voices. This will in turn influence the diversity of values and perspectives that participants are exposed
to.
Extent of explicit consideration of transcendental
values
The extent to which the aim, design and facilitation of the process explicitly considers transcendental values, or helps to
uncover them in deliberative processes, will affect the extent to which participants reflect on these values. Many
transcendental values, particularly where they are shared as communal and cultural values, are implicit or dormant, and
explicit reflection is likely to impact on how participants evaluate particular contexts.
The intensity and length of time of the deliberative
process
More intense deliberation, repeated and/or developed over longer periods of time is likely to lead to more complete,
profound and enduring formation, shaping and sharing of values than shorter, less intense, one-off processes; particularly
in terms of transcendental values.
Extent of exposure to new information New information may result in changes in understanding, particularly where this influences beliefs that mediate between
transcendental and contextual values such as around the consequences of actions or behavioural control (Section 4.3).
Power dynamics and peer pressure Power differences and peer pressure are reflected in the degree to which particular individuals or groups of individuals can
convince other participants on the basis of other factors than communicative reason, e.g. through their political, economic
and social positions, privileged access to pertinent knowledge or others with power, enforcement of social norms, or in
subtler ways through being regarded as an expert in the issue to hand, charismatic, or rhetorically gifted.
Facilitation and process design Facilitation and process design are considered a ‘meta-factor’ that strongly influence how each of the other factors come
into play. Appropriately designed deliberative exercises and facilitation techniques can enable participants to learn and
participate, bring out latent values, enable inclusivity and balance out power dynamics. Weak facilitation and poor design
can exclude, pressure or manipulate less powerful participants, reduce participants’ confidence, bias information and
increase conflict.
J.O. Kenter et al. Ecosystem Services 21 (2016) 194–207
201
operates, and to the VBN and TPB belief constructs around awareness
of consequences, ascription of responsibility, behavioural control and
subjective norms. This process ultimately results in personal and
intersubjective normative conclusions (what should and should not
be done) and these motivate contextual values (the relative evaluations
of diﬀerent objects of value). These contextual values can either be
newly formed where a new context is considered, changed in response
to perceiving and evaluating the context diﬀerently as a result of the
deliberation, or remain unchanged. The latter may result from en-
trenchment, because the deliberation did not change which transcen-
dental values were activated in relation to the particular context, or
because it revealed insuﬃcient new insights around that context. These
contextual values then determine expression of value indicators, either
individually or collectively as a group, through negotiation and
collective agreement, voting, or another appropriate mechanism.
5. A template for designing deliberative valuations
In terms of developing and designing a deliberative valuation in
practice, we propose a template consisting of six main steps, which map
onto the DVF model chain of inﬂuence. Across the steps, the focus of
deliberation shifts between diﬀerent components of the deliberative
process. Valuations on the basis of this template incorporate the key
elements identiﬁed in the previous section as necessary for a robust
process of value formation. However, in practice, under the constraints
of time and resources available, these steps may be combined, re-
arranged or applied more loosely or implicitly. Moreover, the template
is intended as a high level methodological frame that can be adapted
for a broad range of contexts. While we provide examples of methods
and technique that could be used to implement the diﬀerent steps, this
is not intended to be prescriptive, as operationalisation of the template
will need to be aligned to social, cultural, institutional and other
contextual particularities. The six steps include: 1) the institutional
context; 2) transcendental values; 3) contextual beliefs, broader policy
impacts and systemic relations; 4) implications for transcendental
values; 5) norms and contextual values; and 6) value indicators.
5.1. The institutional context
This ﬁrst step concerns establishing the terms of reference for the
decision-making context to hand, explaining to participants the raison
d’être for the deliberation process, the aim of it, the structure, who is
in- and excluded and why, and key limitations. It is crucial for
participants to understand why they are being asked to deliberate
and value, how their values will be utilised and how they will not be,
and that the scope of the deliberation matches the scope of the
decision-making context. This helps ensure that the deliberations do
not omit key issues, but also helps to avoid raising false expectations.
For example, in the study by Ranger et al. (2016), the terms for a
deliberative valuation of implementation measures for a marine
protected area were constrained by the legal competency of the
implementing agency, and thus any measures that fell outside of this
competency were set to be out of scope from the start. This step will
also include an informed consent procedure if appropriate.
Table 4
Potential outcomes of deliberative valuation.
Potential outcome Description
Changes in systemic understanding Through deliberating on new information in combination with social learning processes, participants can change their
understanding of the social-ecological system, e.g. in terms of ecological functions or the impacts of behaviour or
policies. Deliberation can lead to better consideration of the value of the environment in relation to other components
of the social-ecological system. Changing understanding is not always positive, e.g. when people are ‘misinformed’.
Changes in capacity to deliberate Participation in effective deliberative exercises can help build participants’ capacity to analyse and deliberate.
Confidence may be increased, and as a result implicit power differences may be decreased. In contrast, unsuccessful
deliberation can undermine confidence potentially exacerbating differences in participants’ power.
Changes in trust A successful deliberative process can build trust between participants and reduce conflict or the risk of conflict, while
unsuccessful deliberation can exacerbate differences, lack of trust and conflict. Deliberative processes can also
positively or negatively affect trust in decision-makers and institutions relating to the policy context of the valuation.
Improved understanding of values of others When people deliberate and discuss values, they are more likely to understand the values of others and the extent to
which their values are shared. In contrast to adaptation and entrenchment, successful deliberation can help people to
understand that there are multiple ways people express values, with potential for greater acceptance of a decision even
if it is not aligned to their own values. Developing a shared understanding of each others’ values and perspectives can
facilitate establishment of deliberated group values, or lead to ‘agreement to disagree’.
Triggering of dormant values Through debate and deliberative exercises participants can trigger contextual and particularly transcendental values
that are of (potentially profound) importance to them that they had not realised explicitly previously, or that they had
not connected previously, such as implicit or subtle cultural values; activation of these values can lead to significant
shifts in how different options or outcomes are evaluated.
Stronger association of contextual values with
transcendental values
If transcendental values are made explicit, these values are likely to more explicitly guide contextual values and value
indicators.
Shift in value orientation towards the common good Consideration of others’ values and perspectives can lead to an increased felt sense of responsibility and concern for
others compared to the pre-deliberated state, leading to increased realisation of other-regarding values. This may be
paired with an increased sense of ‘common cause’ and development of a joint, mutual or reciprocal moral motivation,
which can lead to increased willingness to sacrifice personal interests, or a shift from ‘consumer’ to ‘citizen’ values.
Adaptation and social desirability bias Where participants feel they are unable to express certain positions, or where they are concerned that their values,
worldviews, beliefs and norms are not taken seriously, they may adapt these to those of more dominant individuals,
the perceived values of facilitators or those instigating the process, or to the group as a whole. This may be a result of
coercion, or, more subtly, adaptation to prevailing norms resulting in social desirability or acquiescence bias.
Entrenchment In contrast to adaptation, participants who feel isolated or threatened may become entrenched in their point of view
when they feel they need to guard their interests.
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5.2. Transcendental values
The next step involves deliberation on the transcendental values of
participants, the communities they represent, and their shared societal
and cultural values. A number of papers in this Special Issue provide
examples of how this could be done. Kenter et al. (2016a) and Orchard-
Webb et al. (2016) utilitise a ‘Transcendental Values Compass’, where
participants systematically identify important transcendental values
and then discuss them. These studies then use storytelling to draw out
values from narratives, which might have otherwise remained dormant.
Edwards et al. (2016) and Fish et al. (2016b) use diﬀerent types of
artistic creations to provoke deliberation. Kenter (2016b) harnesses
open prompts about values, Ranger et al. (2016) develop an ethno-
graphic video-interview method and the Solomon Islands case study in
Raymond and Kenter (2016) apply a combination of ‘participatory
psychometrics’, speciﬁc prompts around what is culturally important,
and storytelling.
5.3. Contextual beliefs, broader policy impacts and systemic relations
At this point, the focus shifts to participants’ beliefs around the
issues at hand, including the consequences of diﬀerent actions or policy
interventions, who is responsible and the roles of diﬀerent institutions,
and behavioural control and self-eﬃcacy, i.e. the degree to which actors
involved are able to inﬂuence potential outcomes. Developing an
understanding of the issue within the broader social-ecological system
can aid understanding of the broader social and environmental impacts
of diﬀerent options. This step can be implemented through structured
analytical approaches, for example through participatory systems
modelling (Kenter, 2016b; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), multicriteria
analysis (Ranger et al., 2016 and Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), or an
option-impact-matrix, where social and environmental impacts, and
those who are impacted, are systematically considered for diﬀerent
policy options (Reed and Kenter, 2015). Speciﬁc knowledges can also
be called upon, including presentations by local and scientiﬁc experts
through presentations (Ranger et al., 2016; Scott et al., 2016), expert
witness hearings (Fish et al., 2013), and structured exercises to elicit
participants’ own knowledge (Kenter et al., 2011).
5.4. Implications for transcendental values
Given an understanding of the impacts of diﬀerent options, the
deliberation then considers the degree to which options are in
accordance with the transcendental values that were deemed of most
importance. For example, if social justice and security were important
values, to what degree are these enhanced or diminished. This step can
be implemented as a follow-on from Step 3, and incorporated through
(typically small group) discussion in conjunction with the various
techniques listed for the previous step.
5.5. Norms and contextual values
The process now starts to integrate material from the previous
stages to discuss and draw conclusions on norms and contextual
values. How norms are expressed or questioned depends on the type
of outcome sought from the deliberative process as a whole. In a more
conventional economic valuation this would be couched in individual,
self-regarding, utilitarian terms, e.g. ‘Given your understanding of the
impacts of diﬀerent options in terms of the things you value, what
should you do to maximise your own individual welfare/preference
satisfaction? ’. Otherwise, the outcome may be framed in terms of the
common good; e.g. ‘Now that we are aware of the impacts of diﬀerent
options in terms of the things we value, and the diﬀerent interests
aﬀected, what ought to happen? ’ Contextual values then reﬂect the
degree to which diﬀerent objects of value (e.g. diﬀerent ecosystem
services), or response options (e.g. policies that aﬀect those ecosystem
services), contribute to the right outcome, and thus the relative worth
or importance of those objects and options. Step 5 can be implemented
as a structured discussion leading up to Step 6.
5.6. Value indicators
Establishing indicators to reﬂect contextual values. This can take
places through individuals identifying willingness to pay, or ratings or
rankings expressing their preferences, or through a collective process of
discussion and negotiation to ﬁnd an agreement, a collective ranking or
‘verdict’, or a vote on preferred policy options and/or on how much
society or individuals should pay towards them. This step would align
with the ﬁnal stages of for example deliberative monetary valuation
(e.g. Kenter, 2016b; Kenter et al., 2016a; Orchard-Webb et al., 2016),
multicriteria analysis (e.g. Ranger et al., 2016), or citizens’ juries (e.g.
Niemeyer, 2004; Fish et al., 2013).
6. Discussion
This paper has presented a new theoretical model of how values are
formed through deliberative processes. This ﬁlls a signiﬁcant research
gap and provides key insights for helping guide deliberative monetary
and non-monetary valuation in environmental and other areas of
research and policy involving evaluation of complex and unfamiliar
goods, uncertainty, contested contexts and conﬂicting interests. We
have conceived deliberative value formation as a process of social
interaction involving the values, worldviews, beliefs and norms of those
taking part, where this process involves both knowledge exchange and
social learning, and deliberation on the transcendental values of
individuals, communities, culture and society.
This conceptualisation is particularly salient because both monetary
valuation and non-monetary approaches to valuing ecosystem services
have so far largely ignored transcendental values (Raymond and
Kenter, 2016). Those calling for pluralistic approaches to valuation
(e.g. Foster, 1997; Sagoﬀ, 1998; Holland, 2002; O’Neill, 2007;
Howarth and Anderson, 2007; O’Neill, Holland and Light, 2008;
Spash, 2008; Lo and Spash, 2012; Baveye, Baveye and Gowdy, 2013;
Parks and Gowdy, 2013; Lo, 2013; Kenter et al., 2015) have high-
lighted certain sets of values that are seen to be particularly important
(e.g. fairness, justice, equity) and have more broadly noted the
importance of ethical pluralism, but have mostly not characterised
how this pluralism can be dealt with in practice. Important contribu-
tions that have highlighted the limits of monetary valuation from a
cultural values perspective (e.g. Chan et al., 2012; Daniel et al., 2012;
Satterﬁeld et al., 2013) do not always clearly distinguish between
transcendental and contextual values and indicators, which makes it
challenging to distinguish evaluations from the values that people rely
on to help guide their choices (also see Fish et al., 2016a). The
ecosystem services literature has so far made few connections with
the social-psychological literature on environmental values in terms of
characterising transcendental values (Raymond and Kenter, 2016).
Conversely, the latter has studied transcendental values in detail but
has undertaken little exploration of contextual values of ecosystem
services (Ives and Kendal, 2014; Bryce et al., 2016).
The DVF model is also more comprehensive than previous frames
for deliberative valuation. Grounded in a social-psychological perspec-
tive it emphasises the role of individual and social norms and social
cues in shaping values and behaviour to a much greater extent than
mainstream economics. It also highlights that the speciﬁc way in which
deliberation or social processes are applied to elicit values, and the way
that a number of key factors, such as institutional factors, participants’
ability to deliberate and group dynamics are managed will have a
deﬁning inﬂuence on what potential outcomes are realised.
Consideration and discussion of these key factors has been quite
limited in the vast majority of empirical deliberative monetary valua-
tion studies in particular, raising questions about the legitimacy of the
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values elicited.
If values are formed through deliberation, some kind of evaluation
is necessary to consider whether the deliberation is legitimately
orchestrated. This requires criteria for legitimacy, which will depend
on how values and valuation are conceived ontologically and episte-
mologically. These criteria clearly diﬀer between on the one hand the
preference utilitarian monism associated with neoclassical economics,
and some non-monetary approaches, and on the other more pluralistic
perspectives associated with ecological economics and the broader
social sciences and humanities (Kenter et al., 2014b; Spash and
Aslaksen, 2015; Raymond et al., 2014; Irvine et al., 2016).
The positivist, neoclassical economic perspective assumes that we
each hold a set of utility-based contextual values hidden from the
researcher but can be gleaned through expression of preferences, with
the strength of preferences indicated by willingness to pay (O’Hara and
Stagl, 2002; Lawson, 2013). Value indicators then imperfectly reﬂect
‘true’ contextual values. If neoclassical assumptions are relaxed to
concede that, in valuation, preferences may not be fully formed for
complex and unfamiliar goods such as biodiversity and ecosystem
services (e.g. Christie et al., 2006; Morse-Jones et al., 2014), the aim of
the deliberative value formation process is then for participants to
rationally consider how much something is worth to them relative to
their existing contextual values for other things, and more speciﬁcally
to help better envisage how a policy or project may impact on their
welfare through impacts on objects of value.
From this perspective, in terms of legitimacy of the deliberation,
most, but not all, of the DVF key factors come into play. For example, it
is central that participants are informed in a transparent, comprehen-
sive and unbiased way, and in a way that suﬃciently enables them to
consider the matter at hand despite limits in prior capacities (e.g.
literacy, education). Individuals also need to be free to deliberate
rationally, i.e. their deliberations are guarded as much as possible from
power dynamics, peer pressure, and pressure from the facilitators
themselves. Indicators for legitimacy could include the conﬁdence that
participants have in their expressed values, satisfaction in the process,
and the degree of learning that has taken place. If these criteria are
met, this can make it believable that, if the sample of participants is
representing a wider population, the wider population would form their
values in a similar way.
However, the DVF is anchored onto the notion of transcendental
values, and highlights their importance in value formation, while
neoclassical economics deems transcendental values largely irrelevant
(O’Hara and Stagl, 2002). Nonetheless, neoclassical, deliberated pre-
ferences approaches can make allowance for ‘weak’ value plurality
(Kenter, 2017), where a value formation process is enhanced by
allowing people to consider their broader aspirations to act as
touchstone for their contextual utility.
Ecological economics and broader social science and humanities
perspectives conceive of value plurality in a stronger way, reﬂecting a
diversity of ethical systems (including rights, duties, virtues, individual
and rule utility, narrative-based ethics; e.g. O’Neill, Holland and Light,
2008). Contextual values are assumed to depend on the way they are
articulated and the social-institutional context in which this occurs
(Vatn, 2009); thus the aim of the deliberative process is more directly
on formation of values through articulation and communication.
Consideration of policy impacts are extended from individual welfare
impacts to deliberation on normative questions and the degree to
which a proposed policy is aligned with participants’ transcendental
values. The emphasis is on legitimacy of the process of group
deliberation, and on communicative rather than instrumental ration-
ality, where reasoned judgment explicitly bridges the moral and
contextual in coming to decisions (Habermas, 1984; Calhoun 1992;
Orchard-Webb et al., 2016).
Here all the DVF key factors come into play, with an emphasis on
the degree to which the institutional context and the way the process is
designed and facilitated enable an approximation of the non-coercive
communication associated with deliberative-democratic ideals. The
DVF provides a structured theoretical framework to help design such
a process, and future research will need to demonstrate empirical
examples of this, which are thus far largely lacking in the environ-
mental valuation ﬁeld, and in particular with almost no examples of
deliberative democratic monetary valuation (Kenter, 2017; Orchard-
Webb et al., 2016). However, there is also much potential to learn from
broader work on stakeholder participation and participatory research
in general that has considered these problematic aspects of participa-
tory and deliberative processes, and how to mitigate or reduce them
through stakeholder analysis, appropriate process design and eﬀective
facilitation (e.g. Pretty, 1994; Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Chambers,
2002; Kumar, 2002; Evely et al., 2011; Fish et al., 2011; Christie et al.,
2012; Rodela, 2012; Mason, 2015; de Vente et al., 2016).
Nonetheless, as Orchard-Webb et al. (2016) point out, there is a
challenging tension here between on the one hand the need for
proactive facilitation and intervention processes to ensure equal
participation, bring out values that might otherwise remain implicit
and stimulate learning, and on the other hand allowing participants the
freedom to set their own terms for deliberation. This ultimately reﬂects
the age-old challenge of how to strike a balance between negative (i.e.
freedom from restraint) and positive (i.e. being enabled) forms of
political freedom (Maccallum, 1967). The DVF can provide a clearer
theoretical backbone for justifying particular orchestrated interven-
tions, based on the deliberative ingredients and steps required for
eﬀective value formation (e.g. exercises to ensure transcendental values
are explicitly deliberated on) and at the same time for reﬂecting on how
facilitation and process design managed the key factors of inﬂuence
(e.g. diﬀerences in capacity to deliberate) to seek or avoid particular
outcomes (e.g. how was social desirability bias avoided? ). This can help
to regulate the substantial power of process designers and facilitators,
and at the same time enable them to enhance their eﬀectiveness and
legitimacy by providing a theoretically and practically grounded
template and checklist of factors that need to be considered.
The DVF can be applied as a foundation for characterising,
designing, facilitating, and analysing a very wide range of deliberative
methods, such as citizens’ juries, in-depth discussion groups, multi-
criteria analysis, deliberated preferences, deliberative democratic
monetary valuation, participatory mapping and modelling, and delib-
erative-interpretive valuation approaches such as art-led deliberations
(see Kenter et al., 2014a; 2015; Kenter, 2016a for classiﬁcations,
typologies and examples of key methods). There is also potential for
pragmatically integrating deliberative and instrumental approaches,
including through the use of non-deliberative surveys that then feed
into a deliberative process (Raymond et al., 2014), or for using the DVF
to help with integrating diﬀerent value streams, ‘multiple balance
sheets’ (UK National Ecosystem Assessment, 2014), or multiple
evidence bases that integrate diﬀerent modes of value elicitation.
Kenter et al. (2014a) provide a broad range of examples of how
deliberation can be integrated in practical applications across diﬀerent
venues for valuation, such as policy appraisal, risk management, and
payments for ecosystem services schemes. The DVF could also be used
as a structured process for participatory action planning and action
research, such as community development or resilience planning. Here
there is particular relevance for development of longer-term delibera-
tive processes that enable more extensive social learning, value change
at the transcendental level, longer-term change in values, and greater
sharing of values. Processes may then go through multiple cycles of the
DVF steps above.
Deliberative processes designed on the basis of the DVF can also
help in understanding and encouraging learning across decision-
making contexts and institutional processes of appraisal. Turnpenny
et al. (2014) and Russel et al. (2014) identify a number of institutional
and cultural barriers to knowledge exchange and social learning about
ecosystem services (and barriers that prevent putting what has been
learned into practice). The authors suggest that communication
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between those who generate and those who use knowledge is key and
propose the creation of neutral spaces where actors from diﬀerent
policy sectors and governance levels can generate more integrated
approaches to environmental issues. Clearly, there are opportunities to
design deliberation into these spaces, which may enhance the eﬀec-
tiveness of environmental management and decision-making. By
bringing together and evaluating policy maker, practitioner, stake-
holder and expert knowledge and perspectives, such deliberative spaces
could become transformative boundary objects between research and
practice (also see Kenter, 2016c).
7. Concluding remarks
Application of a deliberative approach to establish shared values is
likely to be particularly important in cases where: 1) issues or
ecosystem services under consideration are complex; 2) there is
substantial uncertainty; 3) values are likely to be subtle and implicit;
4) issues or evidence are contested; 5) or there are a large number of
diﬀerent stakeholders. If decision-makers take account of a plurality of
value perspectives through an eﬀective process of deliberative value
formation, decisions are likely to be more reﬂective of the values held
by those aﬀected by the decision, better informed, perceived as more
legitimate and less contested.
There is substantial potential for enhancing valuation of ecosystem
services, and more broadly complex public goods, through a structured
process of deliberative value formation. The DVF model provides a
foundation for a more theoretically grounded design of such processes,
and helps explain the relationship between diﬀerent types of individual
and shared values, the key factors that inﬂuence deliberation, and how
these can lead to a range of desirable and undesirable outcomes. Poorly
implemented deliberation can open a door to potential bias, manipula-
tion, entrenchment of values and distrust in inadequately designed and
facilitated processes. However, when managed eﬀectively, deliberation
can enable participants to enhance their systemic understanding and
form values around goods they were previously unfamiliar with, to
consider more fully the value of beneﬁts arising from the natural
environment, and how these relate to their individual and shared
transcendental values that express important principles and life goals.
Whether this results in a greater or lesser value being placed on the
natural environment, deliberation can help participants make pre-
viously implicit values explicit, so that they can be communicated and
debated. This is critical in enabling an eﬀective process of social
learning and democratic deliberation, enabling convergence of values
around peoples’ understanding of the common good or reciprocal
recognition of value diﬀerences. Eﬀective deliberative valuations can
also enhance trust between previously disparate stakeholders.
The extent to which values are formed or changed as a result of
deliberation is likely to be strongly inﬂuenced by the degree of social
interaction and intensity and length of time over which this occurs, the
degree to which participants are able and enabled to deliberate, the
institutional context, group composition, the extent of exposure to new
information and power dynamics. Each of these factors are inﬂuenced
by the design and facilitation of the process. As such, it is our hope that
the DVF model will contribute to eﬀective, carefully designed delib-
erative value formation processes that enhance the comprehensiveness
of valuation in terms of the values it reﬂects, make valuation more
robust in terms of the way values are formed, and enhance its
democratic legitimacy in terms of the way it establishes values for
the common good.
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